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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

WHETHER THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS LAWFUL,

2.

WHETHER EVIDENCE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO OR AS A RESULT OF
THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.

Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review for the issues is for correctness with
no particular deference given to the decision of the district court. Landes v. Capital City Bank,
795 P.2d 1127, at 1129, (Utah 1990).
These issues were preserved in the trial court by the entry of a conditional plea of guilty
under Rule 11 (i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure which provides that:
"With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty—or no contest, reserving
in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment to a review of the
adverse determination of any specific pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails shall be allowed to withdraw the plea,"
The issues were further preserved under the authority of State v Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Ut Ct App., 1988) (conditional plea agreement, record p. 112)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
§41-6-44(11) Utah Code Annotated provides:
"a peace officer may without a warrant arrest a person for violation of this
section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person."
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§77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers.
" A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer—;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; —
§76-8-306. Obstruction of justice—Elements—Penalties—Exceptions.
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a
criminal offense:
(a) provides any person with a weapon;
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person;
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be
false;
(e) harbors or conceals a person;
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of
avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;
(h) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the
offense, after a judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the
information; or
(i) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the
conduct constituting an offense, or any other material aspect of the
investigation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case:
This is an appealfromafinaljudgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County entered by the Honorable Howard H. Maetani on August 1, 2001. It is a criminal action in
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which the Defendant is charged with a violation of Section 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American
Fork City. The Information was filed February 16, 2000 (record p. 5).
Course of Proceedings: To the charges contained in the information the Defendant
initially entered a plea of not guilty (record p. 4). On March 13, 2000 he filed a motion to
suppress evidence obtained while in custody following his arrest, (record p. 16). It was supported
by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (record p.26).
Disposition in the Court below: A hearing was held and oral arguments presented on
May 3, 2000. (record p. 44) On June 28, 2000 the motion was denied.(record p.81).
On January 24, 2001 the Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges contained in
the information. With the approval of the prosecutor and the Court, the issues raised by his
motion to suppress were reserved for review on appeal, (record p.l 10). Final judgment and
sentence was entered August 1, 2001. (record p. 134) A certificate of probable cause was issued
on that date.(record p. 136). Notice of appeal was filed on August 2, 2001 .(record p. 142).The case
was remanded to the trial Court for the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law.(record
169,173). Notice that those were made and entered was filed on May 6,2003. (record p. 196).
This Appeal was filed on June 5,2003. (record p. 198.)
Statement of facts relevant to the issues: The Court made and entered the following
findings of fact relevant to the issues before this Court: (Record p. 192)
1. On January 30,2000, Officers Lisa Shelby and Keith Southard of the American Fork
Police Department were called to assist the Lehi Police Department on a custodial interference
complaint.
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2.

The Lehi Police Department reported that two individuals, Gina Singleton and

Defendant Larry Singleton, had taken the 18-month old daughter of Jamie Boren and
were driving to American Fork.
3.

The report from the Lehi Police also stated that both of the individuals in the

vehicle were intoxicated and provided a description of the vehicle they were driving.
4.

Officer Shelby located a truck that fit the description provided and followed the

truck until it stopped at 403 West 300 South in American Fork.
5.

After the vehicle stopped, the individual on the passenger side exited the vehicle.

Officer Shelby made contact with this individual and informed her as to thy she was
there. The passenger, who was identified as Gina Singleton, told Officer Shelby that she
did have her granddaughter.
6.

Officer Shelby then made contact with the Defendant who was exiting the driver's

seat of the vehicle. Officer Shelby immediately detected the odor of alcohol emanating
from the Defendant.
7.

Officer Shelby then went back to speak with Ms. Singleton. At this time, Officer

Southard arrived on the scene and asked Officer Shelby what he could do to assist.
Officer Shelby told Officer Southard to make contact with the driver, who had been
reported to Officer Southard by dispatch as being intoxicated.
8.

He went to make contact with the driver of the vehicle and observed two men on

the sidewalk that leads to the front door. He approached the younger of the two men first
and asked if he was the driver of the vehicle. The young man then pointed to the
Defendant and said "it wasn't me, it was him."
9.

Officer Southard then contacted the Defendant and asked if he had driven the
-4-

truck. Later Officer Shelby indicated to Officer Southard that the Defendant was the
person she had observed driving the vehicle.
10.

When Officer Southard contacted the Defendant, he noticed that the Defendant's

breath had a strong odor of alcohol and that the Defendant's eyes were glassy and
bloodshot. He also observed that the Defendant's upper body was swaying.
11.

Officer Southard told the Defendant that he thought the Defendant had been

drinking. The Defendant responded by stating, "no you don't, because I haven't had a
damn thing to drink."
12.

Officer Southard then told the Defendant that he would like him to perform field

sobriety tests. The Defendant would start to perform the test and then would become
uncooperative.
13.

The Defendant and his wife then invited the officers into their home to get the

baby out of the cold weather. The officers accepted this invitation.
14.

Once inside the house, Officer Southard resumed his field sobriety tests with the

Defendant. Officer Southard held out his pen and asked the Defendant to touch the top of
the pen with his index finger. The Defendant reached out and touched the pen with his
middle finger, but he had a difficult time doing so.
15.

Officer Southard then tried to complete the test by having the Defendant follow

the pen with his eyes only. Yet, the Defendant refused to comply with the instruction
and just glared at Officer Southard.
16.

The Defendant then told the officers to get out of his house. Officer Southard

responded by stating that the Defendant had invited them into his home.
17.

Officer Southard stated that he believed the Defendant was DUI and that he
-5-

needed to continue the field sobriety tests to determine the Defendant's status.
18.

The Defendant became more uncooperative and stated that the officers needed to

leave his house. Officer Southard told the Defendant that he was going to arrest him for
DUI or he was going to arrest him for obstructing justice for not complying with the field
sobriety tests.
19.

The Defendant walked past Officer Southard and stated that it was "bullshit."

Officer Southard then grabbed the Defendant and placed him in custody.
20.

Eventually, the Defendant was taken to the police station where he was given a

breath test. The results of that test showed that the Defendant had breath alcohol
content of .249.
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY
1.

Refusal to submit to afieldsobriety test does not constitute the offense of

obstructing justice. Commission of that crime involves affirmative action with a specific intent to
hinder, delay or prevent. It does not include benign refusal to assist in building probable cause. It
does not fit the defendant's conduct here.
2.

At the time the defendant was placed under arrest he was not engaged in the

commission of any crime, nor was there probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime
for which a lawful arrest for anything could be justified. The arresting officer was investigating a
possible violation of the traffic rules against driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was
looking for probable cause to support a lawful arrest for that offense. An arrest for obstruction of
justice was an inappropriate means to attempt to achieve that end no matter how well intended it
may have been.
3.

Evidence obtained incident to or resultingfromthe unlawful arrest of the defendant

should be suppressed. This position is supported by case law out of this Court. It is the only
logical remedy available to an aggrieved suspect in a criminal investigation of the type we are
dealing with here. To hold otherwise creates a dangerous precedence.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
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The Defendant refused to submit tofieldsobriety tests. He was warned that to
continue to do so was an obstruction of justice. It is not. No law requires him to do so. Violation
of the obstruction ofjustice statute in Utah requires affirmative action with a specific intent to
hinder, delay or prevent the occurrence of specific events outlined in the statute. It does not
include a person's refusal to do anything but remain silent and motionless when instructed to
engage in conduct the sole purpose of which is to incriminate him by building probable cause to
justify his arrest. As will morefiillyappear in the development of points 2 and 3, the defendant's
conduct does not fit the crime.
POINT 2:

AT THE TIME THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED UNDER
ARREST HE WAS NOT ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF
ANY CRIME, NOR WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE THAT HE HAD COMMITTED A CRIME FOR WHICH
A LAWFUL ARREST FOR ANYTHING COULD BE MADE

The gravamen of the crime of obstructing justice is that the defendant performs an
affirmative act to prevent or hinder the prosecution, conviction, or punishment of someone. The
statute is not applicable to the defendant in this action. Clearly, the offense of obstructing justice
was not being committed by the defendant when he refused Officer Southward's request for the
performance offieldsobriety tests. He was impeding the officer's ability to establish probable
cause to legitimize his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Such conduct is not a
criminal act.
If we conclude as a matter of law that there was no probable cause to effect an arrest of the
defendant for the offense of obstructing justice, it still remains to be determined whether or not
there was probable cause to arrest him for any offense either being committed in the presence of
the officer or for which he had probable cause. The officer's testimony on direct examination at
-8-

the suppression hearing as it relates to the arrest that was made by him played out ais follows: (May
3, 2000; hearing transcript pp. 16-20)
Q:

"On the evening of that day (January 30, 2000) approximately 9:00 p.m. you
responded to 400 West 300 South, American Fork City.

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

What was the reason for your going to that location?

A:

We had received a dispatch on a custodial interference assist for Lelii Police
Department. Officer Shelby had made contact with the suspect vehicle and
suspects. I responded to her location to offer assistance as a back up officer.

Q:

What did you do when you arrived at that location?

A:

When I arrived, I observed Officer Shelby dealing with Gina Singleton. I came up
from behind her and asked her what she needed me to do to assist her in this call.
She indicated that she wanted me to make contact with the driver who I knew from
the dispatch report was intoxicated, or reported as intoxicated. I went to make
contact with the driver of the vehicle.

Q:

Was it the defendant, Larry Singleton?

A:

There was two people I observed in the immediate area of the sidewalk that leads
to the front door. There was a young gentleman wearing a light blue shirt. I
believe his name was Josh Singleton, the son. I approached him first and said,
"Were you the driver of the vehicle?" He pointed towards his dad and said, "It
wasn't me, it was him." And so I in turn made contact with Larry Singleton, who is
the defendant sitting here.

Q:

Then what happened?

A:

I approached Larry and I asked him if he had driven the truck. Larry indicated he
had driven the truck, and Officer Shelby later indicated to me that she had seen him
driving, then exit the vehicle. I advised Larry that I could detect a strong odor of
alcohol coming from his breath. I noticed that he had glassy, bloodshot eyes. And
that while he was talking to me he was slightly swaying, his body would sway back
and forth. I told him that I thought he had been drinking. His response was, "No,
you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to drink." I told him I have dealt
with this enough to know what an intoxicated person looks and smells like and I
believe he had.
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Then what happened?
We went back and forth over this. I told him I wanted to do a field sobriety test.
He would start to do the field sobriety test, and then he would become
uncooperative and wouldn't perform the test for me. He tried to explain to me
what the situation was with their granddaughter and daughter in Lehi. And then I
says, "Look, it's cold out here. Why don't we go inside?" We all proceeded inside
because it was cold.
Whose suggestion was that?
This was Larry's.
Okay, then what happened?
I advised Officer Shelby, "Why don't we take everybody inside where it is warm."
... Once again I explained to Larry that I wanted to conduct a field sobriety test. ...
Once again I returned to my field sobriety tests with Mr. Singleton. I asked Mr.
Singleton if he could see the top of my pen. I told him with which ever index finger
he felt the most comfort with, to reach out and touch the top of my pen. He
reached out with his middle finger and touched it with his middle finger and had a
difficult time doing that. I would explain to him that what I wanted him to do was
to follow the pen, not to move his head.
What, with his eyes?
Follow with his eyes only.
Okay.
He indicated that he understood the instructions. I would attempt to move the pen,
and he would just glare at me angrily. And I says "Okay, let's try this again. You
need to follow with your eyes," and repeated the instructions. We tried that three
or four times. He then explained to me, "You have no right to be in my house.
You don't have a warrant. Get out of my house." And I says, "Well, you invited
us in here. I believe that you are DUI. I need to conduct these field sobriety tests
to further determine your status." And he became uncooperative, and says, "No,
you need to get out of my house." I told him he had his choice as to that. I was
going to arrest him for DUI or that he was obstructing justice by not complying
with my request for a field sobriety. I told him that I would arrest him for that, and
that he could take care of the matter down at the police department.
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Q:

And then what happened?

A:

At that point in time, he walked past me and told me that it was "You know,
bullshit." As he walked past me, I grabbed hold of his wrists and placed him in
custody. He was then placed in my patrol car and taken to the police department.

Q:

Where you performed thefieldsobriety tests and intoxilyzer test?

A:

Once again, he was uncooperative. I explained to him that, you know, I understand
this situation. It was tense with his granddaughter. There was some other issues
there that they were worried about protecting their granddaughter. I says, "You
need to deal with this." I told him that if he would deal with thefiledsobriety tests,
instead of him going to jail, that if he qualified he would be released to a responsible
person. Instead of taking him to jail that night, I would release him to somebody
else. He then cooperated with thefieldsobriety tests at that point in time."

It is apparent that the officer, in essence, observed the strong odor of alcohol on someone
he had reasonable cause to believe had been driving, and he observed red, glassy eyes and a slight
swaying motion. This would be sufficient evidence to stop and detain and to make llirther inquiry.
The officer did that. When that further inquiry produced nothing in the way offieldsobriety tests,
however, he initiated the arrest. That action was premature.
The only probable cause for effecting a valid arrest came as a result offieldsobriety tests
that were performed at the police station after the original arrest had been effected. Again, citing
the transcript (at page 26):
Q:

"Okay, then after you took him into custody, took him to the police station, and he
was under arrest for obstructing justice, that's when you proceeded to perform a
coordination test again, right?

A:

Yes, obstructing justice for not initially taking the field sobriety test.

Q:

Right. And so at the police station he proceeded, under arrest, to cooperate with.
you. He did the horizontal gaze and your (inaudible) test. And he hid... or
attempted the heal-to-toe test, right?
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A:

Yes.

Q:

And at that point in time, you changed it and charged him... you told him he was
under the arrest for DUI. And that's when you told him about the intoxilyzer test
you wanted him to take, right?

A:

Okay, help me understand your question there. Are you saying that I dropped the
obstruction of justice and went with the DUI?

Q:

No, no. I didn't say that you dropped the obstruction of justice charge. I am
saying that at that point after he failed his field sobriety test at the police station
according to the report on page 8, that's when you told him: "You are under arrest
for DUI, and I am requesting that you take the intoxilyzer test." Is that correct?

A:

That's the continuing portion of the DUI protocol. Yes."

The criteria for establishing probable cause to arrest in a case of this kind has been
summarized by this Court in the case of Layton City vs. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (1987) with this
language:
"In determining whether Officer Robinette had probable cause to arrest Noon for
driving under the influence of alcohol we must ask whether from the facts known to
the officer and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom a reasonable
and prudent person in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect
had committed the offense."
In that case the Court found the requisite probable cause based upon the officer's
observations that the defendant smelled heavily of alcohol; the officer had the defendant blow into
the officer's hand to determine the source of the alcohol smell; the defendant could not complete
an accurate recitation of the alphabet A through Z as requested; the defendant attempted to stand
with both legs together and then raise either foot six inches off the ground and hold it there; the
defendant fell backwards almost as soon as he lifted his foot, and the officer caught him in mid fall.
These were all pre-arrest observations. After reciting these facts the Court made the following
statement:
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"Applying this standard to Officer Robinette's knowledge at the time of Noon's
arrest, we are convinced that Robinette reasonably believed Noon had committed
the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol."
The Court noted that the mere fact that the officer had not seen the defendant actually
driving the vehicle was not fatal to the existence of probable cause and we make no such claim in
the case at bar.
American Fork City police officer Southard, in his initial report (Defendant's exhibit I,
record p. 48) made the following observations and statements about his initial contact with the
Defendant.
"I approached Larry SINGLETON and asked him if he had driven the truck.
Larry indicated that he was the driver of the truck. Officer SHELBY later
indicated to me that Larry was the person she observed driving the truck—. I
advised Larry that I could detect a very strong odor of alcohol coming from
his mouth.—
"I advised Larry that I was going to conduct some field sobriety tests. Larry
asked if we could all go inside the house because it was very cold and he
wanted to get his granddaughter inside. We all went into the house.
"3. ATTEMPTED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS;
"Officer SHELBY was in the living room dealing with Gina and I entered the
kitchen trying to get Larry to quit avoiding me and comply with the test I was
requesting of him. Larry finally stood in front of me and I gave instructions
for the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. Larry touched the top of the pen as
requested with the wrong finger. (Middle finger instead of index finger).
Larry was supposed to follow the pen with his eyes, but only glared at me with
an angry look. I re-advised him of the instructions and started the test again.
Once again he refused to follow the pens movements and glared at me.
"Larry then told me I had no right to be in his home without a warrant and
for me to get out of his house. I told Larry he had to comply with my test
request or I would be forced to arrest him for obstructing justice.—
"I again turned my attention back to Larry and asked him if he was going to
take the test or be arrested for obstructing justice. Larry responded with
-13-

"F you, we are just trying to save this baby and all you can do is make
more trouble." I asked my question again and Larry said that I wasn't going
to be arresting anyone. He walked past me into the living room/hallway and I
grabbed his hand and got him into a wrist lock. I advised him that he was
under arrest for obstruction of justice and he started to resist. Officer
SHELBY had to assist me by applying a wrist lock to the other hand. Larry
was placed into handcuffs without any further resistance.
4. FINAL FIELD SOBRIETY TEST;
"I transported Larry to the police department and offered him another
chance at the field sobriety test. He took the requested test and did poorly on
all tests.

5. INTOXBLYZER TEST RESULTS;
"Larry took a breath test and the result was .249. The intoxilyzer result and
operational checklist were placed into evidence."
Applying the Noon case criteria to the facts of this case shows that from the facts known to
the Officer and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent
person in his position would conclude that the situation needed further investigation but not an
arrest. The Defendant could have been detained without arrest while inquiry was made as to what
caused the police to be called in thefirstplace. The officer doesn't disclose any exigent
circumstances that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that immediate attest
under the circumstances was necessary. We must therefore conclude that there were none that
could be articulated, only that it was the convenient thing to do - a shortcut, if you will, to where
the officer wanted to go.
POINT 3:

EVIDENCE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO OR RESULTING FROM
THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT IS INADMISSIBLE
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In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, (Utah 1987), the Court held, in essence, that where an
arrest is illegal, evidence obtained as a result thereof is inadmissible. This position was supported
also in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990). In that case the court made it clear that the
appropriate sanction for illegally obtained evidence is exclusion. If this were a case of harmless
inadvertence on the part of the arresting officer, that is arguably another matter. The record,
including the officer's initial report, (record p. 53), clearly indicates that this was not the case.
Arresting the defendant was a deliberate act intended to place him in a position of custody to
which he should not have been subjected.

Probable cause as the Noon case defines it was not

there.
CONCLUSIONS
The offense of obstructing justice did not occur. At the time of the Defendant's arrest at
his home there was not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that any offense
had been committed. That evidence came only after the initial arrest. It should be inadmissible.
The defendant's motion to suppress that evidence should have been granted, and it was not. This
Court is requested to enter it's order directing that the order of the trial Court dated June 28, 2000
(record p. 81) and the minute entry ruling entered June 14, 2000 (record p. 78) denying the
Defendant's motion to suppress be reversed.
To do otherwise creates a dangerous precedence. It encourages law enforcement officers
to take short cuts to establish probable cause by intimidation tactics. Or at best to arrest on
marginal probable cause where a little more investigation or inquiry might more clearly establish its
existence. It would at least put the investigator in a position to establish that everything that could
have been done to build strong probable cause had in fact at least been attempted. That is the
-15-

criteria by which good police work should be measured. For the Court to take that position goes
a long way toward fostering professionalism in law enforcement.
Respectfully submitted August ££ ,2003

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
A copy of this document kmailed to James Tucker Hansen, Attorney for
PlaintiflTRespondent August ^ ^ 2 0 0 3 first class postage prepaid at American Fork, Utah to the
following address:
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes not reproduced
verbatim in the brief

78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE

(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of sill judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, eh. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other

78-2a-3.

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
P.2d 677 (Utah 1995).

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
14
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d b y L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, c h . 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, c h .
248, § 8; 1990, c h . 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, c h . 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, c h .
159, § 19; 1996, c h . 198, § 49.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
substituted "School and Institutional Trust

Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by t h e
executive director of t h e Department of N a t u r a l
Resources" for "Board of State Lands'* in S u b section (2)(a).
The 1996 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 159, effective
July 1, 1996, s u b s t i t u t e d "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State L a n d s " for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1996 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 198, effective
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d),
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesignated former Subsections (2)(e) to v2)(k) as
(2)(d) to (2)(j).
This section is set out as reconciled b y t h e
Office of Legislative Research and G e n e r a l
Counsel.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Composition a n d j u risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Decisions of Board of Pardons.
Extraordinary writs.
Final order.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
— Sentence reduction.
Cited.
D e c i s i o n s of B o a r d of P a r d o n s .
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, except when the petition additionally challenges
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v.
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994).

Extraordinary writs.
The Court of Appeals h a d jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of mandamus directed
against a judge of t h e district court based o n its
authority under t h i s section to enforce compliance with a prior order a n d to issue writs in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. M u r p h y ,
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct App. 1994).
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) a d d s n o t h ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction —
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes n o t h i n g
from t h e jurisdiction of t h e Court of A p p e a l s —
because jurisdiction over petitions for e x t r a o r dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's j u r i s diction to consider a petition originally filed
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction
over cases t h a t originated elsewhere. B a r n a r d
v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because, under t h i s section, the C o u r t of

15

41-6-43.10.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch.
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12),

relating to negligent homicide, was repealed by
Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(hi) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(b) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(c) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and
(d) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
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ADDENDUM B
Parts of record on appeal
of central importance

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SINGLETON, LARRY J.
403 West 300 South
American Fork, UT 84003

INFORMATION
Citation No. D329581
Case No.

Q(f?\tfl?®fc

DOB: 08-31-54
Defendant.
The undersigned states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the
crime of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in
American Fork City, Utah County, on January 30, 2000,, in violation of Section 41-6-44 of the
Ordinances of American Fork City.
The act ofDefendant constituting the crime was that the Defendant did operate or was
in actual physical control of a vehicle at a time when the Defendant's blood or breath alcohol
concentration was .08 grams or greater or at a time when the Defendant was under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which rendered
the Defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
This information is based on evidence obtainedfromthe following witnesses: Officer
Lisa Shelby.

AMERICAN FORK CITY PROSECUTOR

1
2
3
4
5
6

NOALL T. WOOTTON -- #3554
Attorney tor Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (801)756-3576
Facsimile: (801)756-3578

7
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
8
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

9
10

AMERICAN FORK CITY
11
Plaintiff,

12
13

vs.

14

LARRY J. SINGLETON.

15

DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Case No.

005\OOVb% cr\fc

Defendant.

16
17

Defendant respectfully moves the court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of

18

Criminal Procedure, Amendments 4 and 5 of the United States Constitution and Article I,

19

Sections 7 and 14 of the Constitution of Utah, to suppress all evidence obtained subsequent to

20
the arrest of the defendant at his home on charges of Obstructing Justice.
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No crime was committed in the presence of the arresting officer; and

24

There was no probable cause to believe that the crime for which the arrest was
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The motion is based upon the following facts:

26

made had been committed.

1
2
3

This motion is supported by the attached statement of points and authorities

4

Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing and oral arguments.

5

Dated this Z ^ f d a y of March, 2000.

6
7
8

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant

9
10
11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

12
13

I hereby certify that on this ^-Vh day of March, 2000, a true and accurate copy

14

of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed first class, postage

15

prepaid, to the following:

16
17
18

James "Tucker" Hansen
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY
306 West Main Street'
American Fork, UT 84003
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NOALL T. WOOTTON -- #3554
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (S01) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801)756-3578
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
8
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

9
10

AMERICAN FORK CITY,
11
Plaintiff,

12
13

vs.

14

LARRY J. SINGLETON,

15

: STATEMENT OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS
: Case No. 0O5\0O3*5& mD

Defendant.

16
17
18
19
20

Defendant submits the following statement of points and authorities in support
of his pending motion to suppress.
FACTS
For purposes of this statement, the Defendant relies on the narrative portions of
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Department. That portion of his report is attached to this memorandum. It was received from

24

the Office of the City Prosecutor pursuant to Defendant's request. For purposes of his Motion

25

to Suppress, Defendant will stipulate to the relevant facts as therein set forth.
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the written report of investigating officer Lee Southard of the American Fork City Police
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1
2
On January 30, 2000 at approximately 9:30 p.m. the Defendant was arrested by
3
4

Officer Lee Southard of the American Fork City Police Department. The arrest took place inside

5

the Defendant's home at 403 West 300 South in American Fork City. At that time and place the

6

Defendant was charged with the offense of Obstructing Justice. Immediately prior to the arrest,

7

Officer Southard had been invited by the Defendant into his home where he was advised by the

8

officer that he had been identified as the driver of a vehicle parked outside the house and that he

9
10
11

was suspected of doing so while under the influence of alcohol. The officer detected what he
believed to be a "strong odor of alcohol" coming from the Defendant's breath and asked the

12

Defendant to submit to a series of field sobriety tests. The Defendant voiced his refusal to

13

submit to any such field tests and declined to cooperate when one was attempted. Officer

14

Southard was then invited by the Defendant to leave his house. That invitation was declined.

IS
The Defendant was instead advised he would be arrested for Obstructing Justice if he didn't
16
17

cooperate. The Defendant responded with a renewal of his request that the Officer leave his

18

home whereupon he was placed under arrest for the offense of obstructing justice. Defendant

19

was then handcuffed, taken into custody, and transported from his home to the American Fork

20

City police station.

21

While in custody the Defendant was again directed to submit to a series of field
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tests at the police station. Tests were performed at that time and place. Following their
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completion the Defendant was advised that he was now under arrest for driving under the

« 00

>

. » •

«< g
O

ffl

2

ri

O
^
LL 0)

s|

C Q.
(1) 0)

E a
< l-

2-

26

1
2
3

influence of alcohol and an inioxilyzer test was requested and performed II is the results of this

4

test and the results of the field sobriety tests performed at the police station that the Defendant

5

seeks to suppress.

6

POTNTS

7
1. Refusal to submit to field sobriety tests does not constitute the offense of
8
9

Obstructing Justice.

10

2. At the time the Defendant was placed under arrest for Obstructing Justice, he

11

was not engaged in the commission of any crime nor was there probable cause to believe that he

12

had committed a crime for which a lawful arrest for anything could be justified.

13

3

Evidence obtained incident to or resulting from the invalid arrest of the

14

Defendant is inadmissible.
15
16

17
18
19

AUTHORITIES
State v. Memlozti, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). Where arrest is illegal evidence
obtained as a result thereof is inadmissible.
State r. Lurocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). The appropriate sanction for

20
illegally obtained evidence is exclusion.
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ARGUMENT
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The offense of Obstructing Justice is set out in §76-8-306 of the Utah Criminal

ca rs.

24

Code. A copy of the entire section is attached hereto as part of ihis memorandum. In essence.

k_ 00
O *-"

25

s|

26

o 10
"*• CO
GO •

"5 ^

« CO

GQ

o

•£

= o.
0} O

e »
<

H-

3-

1
2
3

however, it provides that a person is guilty of an offense if, with the intent to prevent, hinder, or

4

delay the discovery apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment OF A_NOTHER for

5

the commission of a crime, he commits one or more of the acts enumerated in said statute. The

6

gravamen of that crime is that the Defendant performs an affirmative act to prevent or hinder the

7
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of someone other than the Defendant. That statute
8
9

clearly is not applicable to the Defendant in this action. Clearly, the offense of Obstaicting

10

Justice was not being committed by the Defendant when he refused Officer Southard's request

11

for performance of field sobriety tests. He was impeding the officer's ability to establish

12

probable cause to legitimize a subsequent arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol,

13

but such conduct is not a criminal act.

14
That having been said, the case law is replete with authority to the effect that the
IS
16

appropriate remedy is to not only find that the arrest was invalid, but that any evidence logically

17

following from it should be declared to be inadmissible. This is not a case of harmless

18

inadvertence on the part of the arresting officer. It was a deliberate act intended to place the

19

Defendant in a position of incarceration to which he should not have been subjected based upon

20

the information the officer had at that time. The Mendoza case and the Larocco case cited above

21
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are examples of the present status of the case law concerning the inadmissibility of evidence that

O

23

has its roots in an arrest that is improper. Probable cause, if any existed, to support the
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subsequent arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, which in turn gave the officer
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the light lo request an inloxilyzer test, all arose out of the initial arrest for obstructing justice

4

That arrest subjected the Defendant lo the in-custody environment in which the subsequent field

5

sobriety tests were performed. They would not have been performed but for that improper

6

arrest

Their results and the results of any chemical test that followed must therefore be

7
suppressed if the current law on the subject is to be followed.
8
In summary, it is submitted that the offense of Obstructing Justice did not occur,

9
10

nor did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that it had Thus, the Defendant's

11

arrest for the same was invalid and any evidence in the nature of field sobriety tests performed

12

after that arrest as well as the inloxilyzer test result should be suppressed.

13

Dated this J ^ " d a y of March, 2000.
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1MOALLT WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant
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In The Fourth District Court, State of Utah
Utah County, American Fork Department
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs
Case #005100338

LARRY J. SINGLETON,
Defendant,

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. The prosecutor is to prepare the appropriate
order.
DATED Qw^

/ ^ > > ^

STWCT(COUKt JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Ruling was
mailed to the following, postage pre-paid, this 15th day of June, 2000.
Bruce Murdock, 306 W. Main, American Fork, Utah 84003
Noall T. Wootton, PO Box 727, American Fork, Utah 84003

s&IJ.

Clerk

Ah-r^*

•.yscv.cj
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1
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2
3
4
5
6

NOALL T. WOOTTON -- #3554
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (801) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
8

UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

9
10

AMERICAN FORK CITY,

CONDITIONAL PLEA AGREEMENT

11

Plaintiff,
12
13

vs.

14

LARRY J. SINGLETON,

15

Defendant.

Case No. 005100338 MD
Judge Howard H. Maetani

16
17

American Fork City, Plaintiff, through James "Tucker" Hansen, its attorney, and

18

the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, and Noall T. Wootton, his attorney of record, hereby stipulate

19

and agree as follows:

20
21

This stipulation is entered into pursuant to the authorization ofState v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, (Utah Ct. App., 1988).
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The Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class B
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misdemeanor, in American Fork City, Utah County, on January 30,2000, in violation of §41-6-
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44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City.
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1
2
On March 7, 2000 the Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress all evidence

3
4

obtained subsequent to the arrest ofthe Defendant at his home on charges of obstructing justice.

5

Having received evidence in support ofthe Defendant's Motion to Suppress and

6

having reviewed the memoranda ofthe parties, this Court issued its ruling on June 14, 2000

7

denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

8
Pursuant to the Court's ruling, the parties hereby specifically agree as follows:

9
10

a. The Defendant shall tender his plea of guilty/no contest to one count

11

of driving while under the influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, as charged in the

12

Information.

13
14

b. The Defendant shall be allowed to preserve his right of appeal in order
to present his challenge to the admissibility ofthe evidence as outlined in his Motion to Suppress.

15
16

c. The City agrees that if the Defendant's arguments in favor of

17

suppression are accepted by the appellate court, the City will not oppose the Defendant's motion

18

to withdraw his above-noted plea.

19

Dated this 2M

day of January, 2001.

20

AMERICAN FORK CITY
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AMED TUCKER HANSEN
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2
3

Dated this

_ day of January, 2001.

4
5

*/&*^

LARR]
Defendant

6

GLETCg^

7
8
9

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant

10
11

APPROVAL OF "SERY" PLEA
12
13

Upon the foregoing stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing, this

14

Court hereby approves the agreement of the parties and orders that the Defendant's plea entered

15

in this matter shall be conditioned on the preservation of his right to appeal this Court's denial

16

of his Motion to Suppress and shall be further conditioned on Defendant's preserving his right

17

to withdraw such plea should his arguments in favor of the suppression be accepted by the

18
appropriate appellate court.
19
20

DATED this £*f day ofm
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2001.

BY THE COURT:
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bGEiHO^ARDf H. MAETANI
Fourth District Court
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4TH DISTRICT CT - AF DEPT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 005100338 MD

LARRY J SINGLETON,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

HOWARD H. MAETANI
August 1, 2 0 01

PRESENT
Clerk:
jilll
Prosecutor: ANDERSON, BRETT C
Defendant
Defendant's

A t t o r n e y ( s ) : WOOTTON, NOALL T .

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
D a t e of b i r t h : August 3 1 ,
Audio

Tape Number:

0189

1954

Tape Count: 1940

CHARGES
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 170
day(s).

Page 1

Case No: 005100338
Date:
Aug 01, 2001
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE
10 DAYS JAIL STAYED IF DEFENDANT COMPLIES.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$200.00
$674.05
$1474.05

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$1000.00
$200.00
$674.05
$1474.05
Plus Interest
The fine is to be paid in full by 08/01/2004.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by DISTRICT COURT.
Defendant to serve 10 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1474.05 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine on or before August 1, 2004.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
KEEP COURT ADVISED OF CURRENT MAILING ADDRESS & AGREE TO SERVICE BY
MAIL. DEFENDANT WAIVES SERVICE BY ANY OTHER MEANS.
DEFENDANT IS TO APPEAR IN COURT WHENEVER GIVEN NOTICE BY MAIL OR
OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE COURT TO DO SO.
DEFENDANT SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR MUNICIPAL LAW
"REPORT TO HUMAN SERVICES, 100 E. CENTER, SUITE L 6 00, PROVO, UTAH,
370-8427 WITHIN 10 DAYS AND MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO HAVE AN ALCOHOL
OR SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION, & PAY THE COST(S) . COMPLETE ANY
RECOMMENDED TREATMENT.
DEFENDANT TO INSTALL IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM WITHIN 3 0 DAYS & IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR COSTS. PROVIDE PROOF TO COURT THAT DEVICE WAS
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INSTALLED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS. DEFENDANT MUST SUBMIT DRIVERS LICENSE TO
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION FOR A RESTRICTION CODE.
DEFENDANT MUST NOT TAMPER IN ANYWAY WITH THE DEVICE. BAC TO BE SET
AT .025 AND IS TO BE MONITORED EVERY 3 MONTHS BY VENDOR. VENDOR TO
OBTAIN THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (VIN) FROM VEHICLE &
REPORT THAT INFO TO THE COURT.
Dated this

/

day of

LlsOtpfUt^

, 20 ^/.

iiOWARD H. MAETANI
District Court Judge

Page 3 (last)

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 005100338 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

I

day

NAME
LARRY J SINGLETON
DEFENDANT
403 W 300 S
American Fork, UT 84 003
BRETT ANDERSON
ATTORNEY PLA
306 W MAIN
AMERICAN FORK UT 84 0 0 3
NOALL T . WOOTTON
ATTORNEY DEF
8 NORTH CENTER STREET
PO BOX 7 2 7
AMERICAN FORE UT 8 4 0 0 3 - 0 7 2 7
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Deputy Court
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NOALL T. WOOTTON - #3554
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (801) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
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UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
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AMERICAN FORK CITY,
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
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LARRY J. SINGLETON,

Case No. 005100338

Defendant.
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Notice is hereby given that the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, appeals to the Utah]

17
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Supreme Court thefinaljudgment and sentence of the above entitled court adjudging him guiltM
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of violating the provisions of 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City which judgment]
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was entered January 24, 2001. Sentence was pronounced August 1,2001.
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The appeal is takenfromthe whole of said judgment that was entered pursuant to
a Conditional Plea agreement.
Dated this /J?~ day of August, 2001.
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NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the 4fr^"day of August, 2001,1 caused the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be duly served upon the following parties by the service method indicated
below.
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James "Tucker" Hansen
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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NOALL T. WOOTTON - #3554
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (801)756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff

: NOTICE OF APPEAL
:

vs.

:

LARRY J. SINGLETON,

: Case No. 005100338

Defendant

:

Notice is hereby given that the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, appeals to the Utah
Supreme Court thefinaljudgment and sentence of the above entitled court adjudging him guilty
of violating the provisions of 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City which judgment
was entered January 24,2001. Sentence was pronounced August 1,2001.
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The appeal is takenfromthe whole of said judgment that was entered pursuant to
a Conditional Plea agreement.
Dated this

of June, 2003.

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the
day of June, 2003, I caused the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be duly served upon the following parties by the service method indicated
below.
James "Tucker" Hansen
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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NOALL T. WOOTTON -- #3554
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street
P.O. Box 727
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727
Telephone: (801) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
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UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
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AMERICAN FORK CITY,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

11
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vs.
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LARRY J. SINGLETON,

15

Case No. 005100338

Defendant.
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Notice is hereby given that the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, appeals to the Utah

18

Supreme Court thefinaljudgment of the above entitled court adjudging him guilty of violating
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the provisions of 41 -6-44 ofthe Ordinances of American Fork City which judgment was entered
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January 24,2001.

21
///

22
CO <0
O |^

O oo

23

O Z, z

24

o co
. E
a> •

25

w
co •

>

•"
£
_ °£

**S
o *-*
a>

LL

m< g ™s |aO

Z

m

CD

O

d <e "H3

26

///
///

1
2
3
4
5

The appeal is takenfromthe whole of said judgment that was entered pursuani
to a Conditional Plea agreement.
Dated this 26/7. day of January, 2001.
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NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
12
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I hereby certify that on this (21g^h day ofJanuary, 2001, a true and accurate copr
ofthe foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailedfirstclass, postage prepaid, to the following
James "Tucker" Hansen
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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